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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARTIN V. ONTIVEROS, ] 
Petitioner and Appellant/ 
vs. ] 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al., 
Respondent and Appellees.] 
) Case No: 940290-CA 
) Priority No: 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of Appellant's Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus entered in the Third District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the Appellant's 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) and Utah R. App. 
P. 3., as this Court has jurisdiction to review a final decision 
entered by a district court of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Appellant was Denied Procedural Due Process by 
the Utah Board of Pardons by Improperly Tolling the Time 
Appellant was Incarcerated in California. 
2. Does the Board of Pardons have jurisdiction and 
authority to continue to incarcerate appellant after Appellant's 
statutory felony sentence expired? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The above-captioned case is a denial of Appellant!s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
1. Appellant was convicted of Burglary, a Second Degree 
Felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 76-6-202, and was sentenced on 
May 18, 1979, to serve a term of imprisonment of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
(See Record, File #00018.) 
2. On December 22, 1987, Appellant was paroled by the Utah 
State Board of Pardons from the Utah State Prison. (See Record, 
File #00074.) 
3. Subsequent to his release from prison, Petitioner was 
allowed to leave the State of Utah and to reside in the State of 
California under an interstate compact agreement, pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-28-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). (See, e.g.. 
Record, File #00079.) 
4. On February 16, 1988, Appellant was arrested by 
California police officers. (See Record, File #00112-228.) 
5. On March 3, 1988, the Utah Board Pardons issued a 
Warrant of Arrest (Warrant) to detain Petitioner for alleged 
parole violations. (See Record, File #00013.) 
6. The Warrant was for the "arrest of [appellant] and to 
cause him or her to be detained and returned to actual custody 
pending a determination whether there is probable cause to 
believe that [appellant] has violated conditions of his parole." 
(See id.) 
7. Appellant was sentenced to serve six years at the 
California State Prison on March 30, 1988. (See Record, File 
#00014.) 
DISCUSSION 
I. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS BY THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS BY 
IMPROPERLY TOLLING THE TIME APPELLANT WAS 
INCARCERATED IN CALIFORNIA 
A. Standard 
The Due Process Clause "is the source of three 
different kinds of constitutional protections." 
Daniels Tv. Williams, 474 U.S. [327, 337 (1986) 
(Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment)] First, it 
provides a "guarantee of fair procedure, . . . referred 
to as procedural due process,'" in connection with any 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by a state. 
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Id. This is "the most familiar office" of the Clause. 
Collins v. harker Heights, [sic] 112 S. Ct 1061, 1068 
[sic] (1992) . Second, the Clause contains a 
substantive component "that protects individual liberty 
against 'certain government actions regardless of the 
procedures used to implement them.'" Id. (quoting 
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 [sic]. This substantive 
component is referred to as substantive due process. 
Id. Third, the Clause incorporates the specific 
protections of most of the Bill of Rights against the 
states. These, too, are referred to as "substantive" 
rights, and are comprised within the "liberty" 
provision of the Clause. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa 
v. Casey, [sic] 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 [sic] (1992). 
See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 337. [Other citation 
omitted.] 
See Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Association, 998 F.2d 1559, 1567-68 
(10th Cir. 1993) . Appellant asserts that the first source of 
constitutional protection, the procedural due process protection, 
is applicable to Appellants issue. 
B. Procedural Due Process 
"[P]rocedural due process questions [are examined] in two 
steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property 
interest which has been interfered with by the state; the second 
examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation 
were constitutionally sufficient." See Kentucky Pepf t of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). In conducting 
its analysis, a court must look to two sources from which liberty 
interest may arise--the Due process Clause itself and the laws of 
the states." See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27, 96 S. 
Ct. 2532, 2537-39 (1976). Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 
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103 S. Ct 864, 868 (1983). Appellant is not asserting a property 
interest in this proceeding and, therefore, Appellant will 
discuss whether he had a federally created liberty interest or, 
alternatively, a state-created liberty interest. 
C. Federally Created Liberty Interest 
The Appellant will concede that, with respect to this 
particular issue, he does not have a federally created liberty 
interest. 
D. The State's Argument at the Lower Court 
The State has argued that 
[o]n May 18, 1979, the court placed Petitioner 
under an "affirmative obligation" to serve his entire 
fifteen-year sentence at the Utah State Prison, unless 
that time was or is shortened by order of the Board. 
See Beal v. Turner, 454 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1969); 
McCoy v. Harris, 160 P.2d 721, 723 (Utah 1945). Thus, 
unless state law specifically creates a right for 
Petitioner to receive credit, against his sentence of 
imprisonment, for time spent outside of confinement at 
the prison, Petitioner has no constitutional 
entitlement to receive credit for such time while 
confined outside the State of Utah by order of a 
foreign jurisdiction. 
(See Record, File # 00165.) (Emphasis provided.) 
E. State-Created Liberty Interest 
The United States Supreme Court has "recognized that a state 
may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
through its enactment of certain statutory or regulatory 
measures.'" See Hansard v. Barrett, 980 F.2d 1059, 1062 (6th 
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Cir. 1992) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1983)). 
In addition, "[t]he Court further explained that, by the use of 
'language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that 
certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed," a 
state may create in its prisoners a protected liberty interest." 
Id. (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471). Further, "'a State 
creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive 
limitations on official discretion.'" See Doyle 998 F.2d at 1569 
(quoting Olim, 461 U.S. at 249). See also Connecticut v. Board 
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennen, J. 
concurring) (liberty interests in inmates if "particularized 
standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers."). 
Finally, "only state law can create [a] 'legitimate entitlement 
[to a liberty interest];" the federal constitution protects such 
claims, but does not create them." See Inmates v. Ohio State 
Adult Parole Authority, 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(alteration inserted). 
F. State Law Giving Rise to Appellant's Liberty Interest 
The relevant Utah Statute giving rise to Appellant's liberty 
interest is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(3) (c) (Supp. 
1989), which provides that "[a]ny time spent in confinement 
awaiting a hearing before the Board of Pardons or a decision by 
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the board concerning revocation of parole constitutes service of 
the sentence." Id. 
On May 18, 1979, Appellant began an obligation to serve an 
indeterminate sentence of one to fifteen years. On December 22, 
1987, Appellant was paroled by the Board from the Utah State 
Prison on December 22, 1987. Subsequently, Appellant was 
permitted to leave the State of Utah to be supervised by 
California authorities pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-24 
(Supp. 1980) . While being supervised by the California 
authorities, on February 16, 1988, Appellant was arrested by the 
California authorities. Finally, on March 3, 1988, the Utah 
Board of Pardons, issued a warrant to detain Petitioner for 
alleged parole violations. 
The State has argued that § 76-3-202(3)(c) "does not address 
[Appellant's] case because he was not awaiting a parole 
revocation hearing or decision of the Board." (See Record, File 
#00167.) However, this is incorrect. The Warrant specifically 
called for the Appellant to be detained and returned to actual 
custody pending a determination whether there is probable cause 
to believe that Appellant violated conditions of his parole. 
(See Record, File #00013.) Accordingly, Appellant has a state 
created liberty interest in having his time spent awaiting a 
parole revocation hearing counted toward his full sentence. 
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The State has also argued that § 76-3-202(4) directly 
applies to Appellant's case. (See Record, File #00168.) This 
section states that "[w]hen any parolee without authority from 
the Board of Pardons absents himself from the state or avoids or 
evades parole supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or 
evasion tolls the parole period." See § 76-3-202(4). 
The first part is inapplicable because Appellant was not 
absent from this State without the Board's approval. With 
respect to either "avoids" or "evades," it is difficult to see 
how Appellant was avoiding or evading supervision by the Board of 
Pardons. This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
Board knew of his arrest and confinement by the California 
authorities. Moreover, it was the Board who issued the Warrant 
for Appellant. 
In addition, contrary to the State's argument, the Board was 
not without complete authority to regain custody over the 
Appellant. See § 77-27-24 (c) (providing that the sending state 
can retake a parolee, after a parolee has a pending charge in the 
receiving state, if consent from the receiving state is 
obtained). Accordingly, had the Board wanted Appellant back, 
then it should have sought consent from California to bring 
Appellant back to serve any addition sentence, as deemed 
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appropriate, before Appellant began serving his sentence in 
California. 
II. WHETHER THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAS JURISDICTION 
AND AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE TO INCARCERATE APPELLANT 
AFTER APPELLANT'S STATUTORY SENTENCE HAS EXPIRED 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-2 02 (2) requires that a person be 
discharged when his maximum sentence has expired. In this 
matter, Appellant's full sentence has expired. Accordingly, any 
further incarceration against appellant amounts to nothing less 
than double punishment. "'By forbidding that no person shall "be 
subject for the same offense to be put twice in jeopardy of life 
or limb," [the safeguard of the Fifth Amendment against double 
punishment] guarded against the repetition of his history . . . 
punishing [a man] for an offense when he had already suffered the 
punishment for it.'" See North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 
729 (1969) (citation omitted) (alterations in original) (ellipsis 
in original). 
Again, because Appellant's full sentence has expired, any 
further incarceration by the Board of Pardons amounts to double 
punishment crime 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Appellant should be granted the 
relief requested. 
DATED this 30 day of November, 1994. 
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David L. Grindstaff 
Attorney for Appellant 
Page -10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was MAILED, postage prepaid this 30th 
day of November, 1994. 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Lorenzo Miller 
330 South 300 East 
SLC, Utah 84111 
^ L _ 
Page -11-
